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Abstract—Short-term electricity market is made up of a
sequence of markets, that is, it is a multimarket enviroment. In
the case of the Iberian Energy Market the sequence of major
short-term electricity markets are the day-ahead market, the
ancillary service market or secondary reserve market (henceforth
reserve market), and a set of six intraday markets. Generation
Companies (GenCos) that participate in the electricity market
could increase their beneﬁts by jointly optimizing their par-
ticipation in this sequence of electricity markets. This work
proposes a stochastic programming model that gives the GenCo
the optimal bidding strategy for the day-ahead market (DAM),
which considers the beneﬁts and costs of participating in the
subsequent markets and which includes both physical futures
contracts and bilateral contracts.
Index Terms—spot electricity markets, ﬁnancial electricity
markets, Iberian Electricity Market, stochastic programming,
perspective cuts.
INTRODUCTION
Finding the optimal bid to the day-ahead market (DAM)
is a crucial decision in the daily operation of any genera-
tion company (GenCo), as DAM is the market where the
most important part of the electricity demand is negotiated
(78% in the case of the Iberian Electricity Market (MIBEL)).
Moreover, current electricity markets are organized around
a variety of markets, both ﬁnancial (futures contracts (FC),
bilateral contracts (BC)) and spot (day-ahead market (DAM),
reserve market (RM) and intraday market (IM)) with a strong
dependence between them. Therefore, any GenCo aiming to
participate in the DAM can no longer ﬁnd its optimal bid
without considering the relation between DAM and the rest of
the spot and ﬁnancial markets. Optimal multimarket electricity
bid (OMEB) models are large scale nonlinear combinatorial
stochastic optimization models designed to help GenCos to
ﬁnd the optimal offer bid of each one of their generation
units in such a complex multimarket framework. Due to the
large scale and complexity of the OMEB models, commer-
cial optimization software cannot reach the optimal solution
within the time required by the DAM’s submission deadline,
and more efﬁcient combinatorial nonlinear optimization al-
gorithms are required. The ﬁrst part of this work presents a
new multistage stochastic optimization model for the OMEB
problem that ﬁnd the optimal bid for the DAM taking into
account the relation between this spot market and the rest
of the market mechanisms (FC, BC, RM, IM) in the Iberian
Electricity Market. The proposed methodology provides, for
each GenCo’s generation unit, the optimal unit commitment,
and the optimal bid to the DAM. This optimal bid integrates
the negotiated energy of the ﬁnancial markets (FC and BC),
and takes into account the stochastic behavior of the three spot
markets (DAM, RM and IM). The second part of the work
will present the methodology and computational results of the
application of the perspective cuts algorithm to the solution
of the OMEB problem. The solution to a real case instance
of the OMEB problem corresponding to GenCos operating in
the MIBEL will be presented and analyzed.
I. LITERATURE REVIEW
The optimal multimarket bidding problem has not been
studied as much as the day-ahead bidding problem and there
are few research groups that have confronted this problem
with stochastic techniques. The work of [1] is one of the ﬁrst
works that deﬁnes a bidding strategy for a GenCo participating
in a sequence of three short-term markets. The work in [2]
considers a multistage stochastic model to decide the unit
commitment and the capacity allocation in each market but
without any bidding strategy. Furthermore, [3] propose a
stochastic model for obtaining the bid curve to be submitted
in each market. The most recent contribution, [4], can be
consider as an extension of [2], where a risk aversion tool is
added together with the satisfaction of the committed bilateral
contracts. Contrary to the previous contributions, our approach
takes into account the sequence of markets according to the
speciﬁc characteristics of MIBEL regulation and two different
medium-term products, BCs and FCs. The model presented
here extends the optimal bid model in [5], [6] and [7] to the
multimarket environment. The work in [8] follows the same
idea presented in this paper but (a) with a simpliﬁed mod-
elization where only linear generation costs were considered
and unit commitment was excluded and (c) using commercial
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general purpose optimization software instead of specialized
algorithms.
II. FUNDAMENTALS AND HYPOTHESIS
A. Fundamentals
The main characteristics of the three electricity markets
considered in this work are:
• Day-ahead market: it is the market where the most
important part of the energy transactions are negotiated.
It takes place the day before the delivery day. It has 24
simultaneous auctions, one for each hour of the next day.
The DAM matching process is coordinated with the BCs
and the physical FCs as it will be explained later.
• Reserve market: takes place after the DAM matching
process. It is an ancillary service market where the
participants send bids to increase or decrease the matched
energy of the units in the DAM.
• Intraday market: takes place just before and during the
delivery day. It is composed of 6 consecutive markets.
In these markets the GenCos can either sell or buy
electricity, that is, they can participate as buyers or sellers
of energy. A speciﬁc unit can participate in these markets
either if its bids have been matched in the DAM or if it
is producing energy to settle BCs.
These three markets are sequentially cleared leading to a
multistage stochastic programming problem associated with
a set S of scenarios of the DAM, RM and IM market prices
λs = {λD,s1 ..λD,s24 , λR,s1 ..λR,s24 , λI,s1 ..λI,s24 }, s ∈ S.
The MIBEL rules force the GenCo to include in the DAM
bid process the settlement of the energy from other market
mechanisms. In this work, the national bilateral contracts and
the futures physical contracts matched at the derivatives market
are included. Regarding the physical futures contracts portfolio
and the day-ahead bidding mechanism OMEL demands every
GenCo to commit the quantity designed to futures contracts
through the day-ahead market bidding of the physical units that
form each UCP, a pre-stablished subset of the thermal units
which will generate the energy to cover the corresponding
contract. This commitment is done by the so called instru-
mental price offer, that is, a sale offer with a bid price of
0e/MWh (also called price acceptant). Due to the algorithm
the market operator uses to clear the day-ahead market, all
instrumental price offers will be matched (i.e. accepted) in the
clearing process, that is, this energy shall be produced and will
be remunerated at the spot price.
Bilateral contracts in the MIBEL has the classical charac-
teristics, they are agreements between a generation company
and a qualiﬁed consumer to provide a given amount of
electrical energy at a stipulated price along a delivering period.
The characteristics of the bilateral contracts (energy, price,
delivering period) are negotiated before the DAM and the
energy that is destined to the BC is excluded from the DAM
bid. Accordingly to the MIBEL rules, the DAM bid of each
unit must include the whole available energy not allocated to
the BC contracts.
B. Hypothesis
The model is built for a price-taker GenCo owning a set
of thermal generation units I with startup, shutdown and
quadratic generation costs. We will assume some modeling
hypothesis about the RM and IM. First, we suppose that all
the units in our model are capable of changing their production
according to the requirements of the ISO, which means all the
available units can participate in the RM. Second, we also
suppose that if the GenCo participates in the RM, then it will
always bid the automatic generation control (AGC) capacity of
the unit, an operational characteristic of each unit that indicates
the quantity that the unit is able to increase or decrease in a
given time. This hypothesis follows the real behavior of some
GenCos observed in the MIBEL. Moreover, we work only with
the ﬁrst IM session, the session in which the greater part of the
energy is negotiated. Finally, we suppose that all the energy
that is bid to the RM or the IM will be matched. This can
be easily forced by some bidding strategies, but this point is
not dealt with in this work. These hypothesis do not limit the
correct representation of the MIBEL’s market sequence and
they can be easily changed or adapted to different situations.
III. MODEL DESCRIPTION
A. Variables
For every time period t ∈ T and thermal unit i ∈ I , the ﬁrst
stage variables of the stochastic programming problem are:
• The unit commitment variables: uti ∈ {0, 1}, cuti, cdti
• The instrumental price offer bid variables: qti.
• The scheduled energy for futures contract j variables:
ftij .
• The scheduled energy for bilateral contract variables: bti.
and the second and third stage variables associated with each
scenario s ∈ S are:
• Total generation: gsti
• Matched energy in the day-ahead market: psti
• Reserve market related variables: rsti
• Intraday market related variable: msti
B. FCs and BCs Covering Constraints
Both the physical future and bilateral contracts coverage
must be guaranteed:∑
i∈Ij
ftij = LFj ∀j ∈ F, ∀t ∈ T (1)∑
i∈I
bti =
∑
j∈B
LBj ∀t ∈ T (2)
ftij ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ F, ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (3)
0 ≤ bti ≤ P iuti ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (4)
C. Reserve Market Constraints
By hypothesis the model for the RM assumes that if the unit
bids to the RM, it will bid its ﬁxed AGC capacity, i(MW).
Therefore the only decision to be optimized is whether the unit
participates in the RM or not. It is known that a unit can only
use its AGC capacity if its generation level is constant; in other
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words, the unit is not increasing or decreasing its production in
the corresponding interval or, equivalently, that the production
level gsti has not changed between two consecutive intervals.
For all intents and purposes, the GenCo delegates its ramping
capacity to the ISO. The binary variable rsti is introduced to
trace this situation, being that rsti = 1 whenever g
s
ti = g
s
(t−1),i
and rsti = 0 otherwise.
gsti − gs(t−1),i ≤ (1− rsti)P i ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S
(5)
gsti − gs(t−1),i ≥ (1− rsti)(−P i) ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S
(6)
Moreover, uncommitted units (uti = 0) cannot bid to the RM:
rsti ≤ uti ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I, ∀s ∈ S (7)
D. Matched Energy Constraints
The MIBEL’s rules affecting the day-ahead market estab-
lishes a given relation between the variables representing the
energy of the bilateral contracts bti, the energy of the future
contracts ftij , the instrumental price offer bid qti and the
matched energy psti. This relation can be formulated by means
of the following set of constraints:
psti ≤ P iuti − bti ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S (8)
psti ≥ qti ∀i ∈ Ut, ∀t ∈ T, ∀s ∈ S (9)
qti ≥ P iuti − bti ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (10)
qti ≥
∑
j|i∈Ij
ftij ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ∈ T (11)
where:
• (8) and (9) ensures that if a unit is on, the matched energy
psti will be between the instrumental price bid qti and the
total available energy not allocated to a BC.
• (10) and (11) guarantee respectively that the minimum
generation output of the committed units will be matched,
and that the contribution of the unit to the FC coverage
will be included in the instrumental price bid.
E. Total Generation and Intraday Market Constraints
Finally, the total generation level of a given unit i, gsti, is
deﬁned as the addition of the allocated energy to the BC,
plus the matched energy in the DAM and IM (psti and m
s
ti
respectively).
gsti = bti + p
s
ti + m
s
ti ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I, ∀s ∈ S (12)
The model considers the possibility of either selling (msti > 0)
or buying (msti < 0) energy to the IM. The total generation
gsti must remain within the operational limits P i and P i. But
if we participate in the RM, the total generation limits change
because of the energy that we must reserve in order to be able
to produce it at the moment that the ISO requests:
P iuti+ir
s
it ≤ gsti ≤ P iuti−irsit ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I, ∀s ∈ S
(13)
F. Nonanticipativity Constraints
Nonanticipativity constraints impose that the value of the
second and third stage variables will be the same for those
stages and scenarios sharing the same value of the random
variables λs :
gsti = g
sˆ
ti ∀s, sˆ : (λD,s = λD,sˆ), ∀t ∈ T (14)
rsti = r
sˆ
ti ∀s, sˆ : ((λD,s, λR,s) = (λD,sˆ, λR,sˆ)), ∀t ∈ T
(15)
where (14) models the nonanticipativity constraints for the
DAM stage and (15) models the nonanticipativity constraints
for the RM stage.
G. Unit commitment
Following [9], let uti be the ﬁrst-stage binary variable
expressing the off-on operating status of the ith unit and
cuti, c
d
ti, continuous variables representing the startup and
shutdown cost, respectively, of unit i in interval t. Additionally,
constant Gi, will be the number of periods that unit i must
be initially online, due to its minimum up-time toni , and Hi,
will be the number of periods that unit i must be initially
ofﬂine, due to its minimum down-time tdowni . The following
set of constraints conveniently models the start-up and shut-
down costs and the minimum operation and idle time for each
unit (see [9] for details):
cuti ≥ coni [uti − u(t−1),i] ∀t ∈ T \ {1}, ∀i ∈ I (16)
cdti ≥ coffi [u(t−1),i − uti] ∀t ∈ T \ {1}, ∀i ∈ I (17)
Gi∑
j=n
(1− uji) = 0 ∀i ∈ I (18)
Hi∑
j=1
uji = 0 ∀i ∈ I (19)
t+toni −1∑
n=t
uni ≥ toni [uti − u(t−1),i]
∀t = Gi + 1, . . . , |T | − toni + 1 ∀i ∈ I (20)
t+toffi −1∑
n=t
(1− uni) ≥ toffi [u(t−1),i − uti]
∀t = Hi + 1, . . . , |T | − toffi + 1∀i ∈ I (21)
|T |∑
n=t
(uni − [uti − u(t−1),i]) ≥ 0
∀t = |T | − toni + 2, . . . , |T | ∀i ∈ I (22)
|T |∑
n=t
(1− uni − [u(t−1),i − uti]) ≥ 0
∀t = |T | − toffi + 2, . . . , |T | ∀i ∈ I (23)
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H. Objective Function
The quadratic function that represents the expected beneﬁts
of the GenCo:
Eλ
[
B(g, p,m, r, u, cu, cd)
]
=
=
∑
t∈T
⎡⎣∑
j∈F
(λFj − λ
D
i )L
F
j +
∑
j∈B
λBj L
B
j
⎤⎦ (24)
−
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
[cuti + c
d
ti + c
b
iuti] (25)
+
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
∑
s∈S
P s
[
λD,st p
s
ti + λ
R,s
t ir
s
ti + λ
I,s
t m
s
ti
−(cligsti + cqi (gsit)2)
]
(26)
where:
(24) corresponds to the incomes of the FCs and the BCs and
is a constant term.
(25) is the on/off ﬁxed cost of the unit commitment of the
thermal units, deterministic and independent of the real-
ization of the random variable λDt = {λDt , λRt , λIt }.
(26) represents the expected value of the beneﬁts from the
DAM, the RM and the IM. The ﬁrst term, λD,st p
s
ti,
computes the incomes from the DAM based on a value
psti of the matched energy. The second term, λ
R,s
t ir
s
ti
computes the incomes from bidding the AGC capacity to
the RM. The third term, λI,st m
s
ti computes the incomes or
costs from the IM, depending on the sign of msti. Finally,
the term between brackets corresponds to the expression
of the quadratic generation costs with respect to the total
generation of the unit, gsti.
Then, the objective function f(x) to be minimized in our
model is:
f(g,p, r,m, u, cu, cd) =
∑
i∈I
∑
t∈T
(
cuti + c
d
ti + c
b
iuti
+
∑
s∈S
P s
[
clig
s
ti + c
q
i (g
s
ti)
2 − (λD,st psti)
−(λR,st rstii)− (λI,st msti)
])
(27)
where λD,st , λ
R,s
t , λ
I,s
t are the price scenarios for the t
th day-
ahead, reserve or intraday market respectively.
I. Optimal multimarket electricity bid model (OMEB)
The ﬁnal Optimal electricity multimarket bid (OMEB)
model developed in the previous sections is:
(OMEB)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
min f(g, p, r,m, u, cu, cd)
s.t.
Eq. (1)− (4) BC and FC
Eq. (5)− (6) RM
Eq. (8)− (11) DAM
Eq. (12)− (7) Tot. gen.
Eq. (16)− (23) UC
(28)
This program corresponds to a mixed linearly constrained min-
imization problem with a convex quadratic objective function
with a well-deﬁned global optimal solution.
IV. PERSPECTIVE CUTS
In order to solve OMEB model by commercial MILP
software, the quadratic part of the objective function must be
linearized. Since the sum of the probabilities P s equals one,
we can include the products cbtiuti in the quadratic parenthesis
for each block (i, t, s) in this way:
cqi (g
s
ti)
2 + clig
s
ti + c
b
ituti,
where the variables uti are binary. For notational simplicity
the indices will be omitted in the rest of this section. The
issue is then how to best represent the quadratic function
f(g, u) = cqg2 + clg + cbu (29)
by means of a piecewise-linear one. There is an effective way
based on ideas developed by [10]. Note that, as u is binary
and uP ≤ g ≤ uP , we have
f(g, u) =
{
0, if u = 0
f(g) = cqg2 + clg + cb, if u = 1
Moreover, when we use the branch and cut methods in order to
ﬁnd lower bounds for the optimal value, we solve continuous
relaxations of the mixed integer linear problem, i.e. with u ∈
[0, 1]. Therefore, a natural question is whether we can obtain
a convex function with an tighter epigraph for f(g, u), which
can be used to calculate those lower bounds, this leads us
to take into account the convex envelope of f(g, u). As it is
shown in [10] the convex envelope is
h(g, u) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, if (g, u) = (0, 0)
cqg2
u
+ clg + cbu,
{
if uP ≤ g ≤ uP ,
for u ∈ (0, 1]
}
+∞, otherwise
(30)
This function is the perspective-function f˘(g, u) = uf(g/u)
of f(g), with u limited to be in [0,1], which is known to
be convex if f(g) is convex, see [11]. In addition, to show
that h is a tighter objective function than f for the
continuous relaxation it is enough to compare (29) and (30)
for 0 < u ≤ 1. Also, for g ∈ [P , P ] and u ∈ [0, 1] it can
be showed that the maximum value of h(g, u)− f(g, u) over
the domain of both functions (deﬁned by the pyramid having
as base [P , P ]× {1} and vertex [0, 0]) is cqP 2/4, attained at
(P/2, 1/2); i.e. h penalizes the highest non-integrality in the
domain. Nevertheless, due to the strong nonlinearity and the
nondifferentiability of h(g, u) at (0, 0), it is not practical to
use it as the objective function instead of f(g, u). A way of
overcoming this difﬁculty is to replace h(g, u) with the point-
wise supremum of afﬁne functions, which is possible because
the convexity of h. As is showed in [10], by means of the
subgradient inequality
h(g, u) ≥ h(ĝ, û) + (s1, s2)
(
(g, u)− (ĝ, û)
)
,
where (s1, s2) ∈ ∂h(ĝ, û), the epigraph of h is deﬁned by
the subset of
{(v, g, u) | uP ≤ g ≤ uP and 0 ≤ u ≤ 1}
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that is solution of this inﬁnite linear-inequality system
v ≥ (2cq ĝ + cl)g + (cb − cq ĝ2)u, taking ĝ ∈ [P , P ].
(31)
For each ĝ we have an inequality so-called a perspective
cut (PC), which is the unique supporting hyperplane to the
function passing by (0, 0) and (ĝ, 1). Consequently, PC
formulation (PCF) consists of using these perspective cuts to
construct an objective function that is the point-wise maximum
of the linear functions of these hyperplanes, i.e. it is a
polyhedral function. A small set of initial PCs is chosen to
solve the problem with the continuous relaxation. Then, given
a solution (v∗, g∗, u∗) corresponding to an approximation of
h by a ﬁnite number of perspective cuts, when u∗ > 0, it is
tested to know if this solution fulﬁlls (31) with ĝ = g∗/u∗;
otherwise, this supporting hyperplane is a new perspective cut
to be added to PCF. Thus, additional cuts are then dynamically
generated when necessary.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
The OMEB model (28) has been implemented and solved
with CPLEX 12.0 [12] using the ad-hoc implementation of the
perspective cuts algorithm described in Section IV. It has been
solved using a SunFire X2200 with 32 Gb of RAM memory
and two dual core processors AMD Opteron 2222 at 3 GHz.
The total execution times for the perspective cuts methodology
are shown in Table I. It must be stressed that all these problems
were unsolvable with CPLEX (the execution aborted with an
internal error after several days of execution).
A. Scenario generation and reduction
All the available historical data of the sequence of market
prices has been reduced in order to obtain suitable scenario
sets. Initially, all the instances are equiprobable and, after
applying the reduction algorithm [13], the different subsets
of scenarios and the respective probabilities are obtained. The
main computational characteristics for each reduced set of sce-
narios are in Table I. It can be observed that both the objective
function and the variation of the optimal value of the variables
(measured through the index ‖x
s−x180‖
‖x180‖ ) stabilizes after 50
scenarios. Considering the computational burden introduced
by the increase of second and third stage binary variables as
the number of scenarios grows, we conclude that 50 scenarios
retain enough information to obtain suitable results.
B. Case Study
A set of computational tests has been performed in order
to validate the proposed model. The instances used in the test
have 9 thermal units. Its technical values can be obtained from
the authors upon request. One of the objectives of the tests is to
study the inﬂuence of the sequence of markets in the DAM bid.
As it has been explained, the DAM bid of the GenCo will be
ﬁxed by the quantity committed to bilateral contracts, that will
be excluded from the DAM bid, and the quantity committed to
futures contracts, which must be bid at the instrumental price
(see [6]). Thus, we focus on the two variables that represent
these quantities in order to study its optimal value when taking
TABLE I
OPTIMIZATION CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CASES STUDIES AND RESULTS
FOR DIFFERENT NUMBER OF SCENARIOS.
|S| c.v. b.v. CPU(s) Objective function ‖xs−x180‖‖x180‖
25 19680 6240 612 89230500 1,000
50 37680 12240 3093 88268300 0,001
75 55680 18240 12316 88624200 0,002
100 73680 24240 25728 88177400 0,001
120 88080 29040 32570 88209200 0,001
140 102480 33840 60030 88318100 0,002
160 116880 38640 74865 88298800 0,002
180 131280 43440 93532 88209200
|T | = 24; |I| = 9
into account, or not, the sequence of markets. The optimal
value of these two variables can be observed in Figure 1.
This ﬁgure represents the economic dispatch of the bilateral
contracts, i.e., the quantity each unit commits to the bilateral
contracts for each interval t, and the quantity to cover the
futures contracts. It can be also observed the big differences
among the optimal economic dispatch if we include the RM
and the IM in the optimization model (Figure 1(a)) or not
(Figure 1(b)). On the one hand, if a unit participates into the
RM market, it must reserve a part of its participation and
thus cannot use it to cover the medium-term products (see,
for instance, Unit 2 at intervals 3, 7 or 8). On the other hand,
they could buy or sell energy into the IM, and this can change
the settlement of the medium-term products. Those differences
will lead to different offer curves for each unit and interval.
Finally, although second and third stages variables are not
related with any actual decision, as they differ from scenario to
scenario, it could be interesting to observe the behavior of the
GenCo in the IM, where the GenCo can submit either sell or
purchase bids, depending on the sign of variable msti (m
s
ti > 0
and msti < 0 respectively). Figure 2 represents the bidding
energy for a given unit throughout the 24 hourly auctions of the
IM market day at two different scenarios. It can be observed
that, depending on the auction, the GenCo either buys or sells
energy, or it does not participate in the IM.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work has developed a new quadratic mixed-integer
stochastic programming model, to assist to the optimization of
the day-ahead bid with futures and bilateral contracts taking
into account the reserve and the intraday market. The optimal
solution of our model determines the optimal instrumental
price bidding strategy and the optimal economic dispatch for
the BCs and the committed FCs for each hour. The model
maximizes the expected beneﬁts of the sequence of electricity
markets while satisfying the thermal operational constraints
and the MIBELs rules. The results of the computational tests
validate the model and show the inﬂuence of market sequence
on the optimal bidding strategy of the GenCo, as well as the
short-sight effect of optimizing the DAM bid without taking
into account the possibilities of the next markets.
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Fig. 1. Economic dispatch of bilateral and futures contract, bti (blue) and
qti (orange) . (a) Taking into account market sequence (b) With the DAM
only.
Hour
E
ne
rg
y(
x1
00
0k
W
h)
5 10 15 20
−4
0
0
40
Fig. 2. Energy send to the IM by Unit 1 in two different scenarios.
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